EVEN before Operation Barbarossa petered out in
The specific oilfields that Hitler mentioned lay in the North Caucasus, a region in present-day Russia comprising mainly steppes, rolling hills and desert lands. During the Second World War it produced grain, cotton, and heavy farm machinery. Its two main oilfields-Maikop, near the Black Sea, and Grozny, near the Caspian-produced about 10 percent of all Soviet oil.6 South of the Caucasus Mountains lies the densely populated region of Transcaucasia, today comprising the nations of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. In 1942 this heavily industrialized region had a population density almost as great as the state of New York.7 Baku, capital of Azerbaijan and situated on one of the world's richest oilfields, alone produced 80 percent (in 1942, twenty-four million metric tons8) of all Soviet oil. Baku's oil flowed by pipeline westward through Tbilisi, capital of Georgia, to Batumi, a major oil transit port on the Black Sea. Oil going to Moscow, Gorkii, and the main industrial centres in the west went by ship to Astrakhan at the mouth of the mighty Volga River, then up the Volga to its destinations. Oil bound for the industrial areas of the Urals and Siberia went by ship up the Caspian to Gurev, where it travelled by pipeline to Ufa, almost a thousand kilometres to the north. From there it went by rail to its destinations.9
During the winter of 1941-42, Hitler had managed to convince his senior military advisors that his plan to occupy the Caucasus and seize the oilfields made perfect sense. Germany's armaments industry, they came to believe, would benefit considerably from the seizure of the manganese deposits at Chiaturi in Transcaucasia. They were the richest single source in the world, yielding 1.5 million tons of manganese ore in 1940 (over half the Soviet Union's total10). The oilfields, though, were the THE JOURNAL OF real goal. Their seizure would relieve Germany's critical oil shortage and enable it, if necessary, to continue fighting in a drawn-out war of economic attrition. Their seizure would also greatly offset the constant danger of Allied air attacks against the Ploesti oilfields in Rumania and the Reich's own synthetic oil plants. More importantly, the capture of the oilfields, the severance of the railways between them and the main Soviet industrial regions, and the blocking of the vital Volga River system would deliver a powerful blow to the Soviet economy and war effort.
Throughout this period Hitler and his military advisers apparently never discussed in detail the important question of how Caucasus oil would be transported to the Reich. A quarter of a century earlier, this problem had also vexed General Erich Ludendorff and the German High Command, who never arrived at an adequate solution.11 The over-worked Fiihrer may not even have realized the importance of this matter, considering it best simply to cross that bridge when he came to it. Apparently he supposed Axis convoys would carry much of the oil across the Black Sea to Rumanian ports, while the rest would travel by ship across that sea, through the Bosporus and Dardanelles into the Aegean Sea. From there it would continue on to Italian and occupied Greek ports. oil.14 The only remaining route was across the Black Sea, through the Dardanelles, and on to Mediterranean ports. Accordingly, the report concluded, "the opening of the sea routes and the security of the tankers in the Black Sea is the prerequisite for the use of Russian supply sources in sufficient quantity to support the further continuation of the war." Clearly, to attain this prerequisite was virtually impossible by early 1942; the Germans would have had to wipe out the powerful Soviet Black Sea Fleet (which still had, according to Groladmiral Raeder, "naval supremacy . .. [allowing] great freedom of movement"15) and to eliminate British air and sea power from the eastern Mediterranean.
Despite not considering how best to solve this logistics nightmarewhich never occurred, because, as shown below, the German Army captured only the already-wrecked Maikop oilfield-Hitler and his courtiers were not entirely lacking in forethought. When planning the forthcoming campaign during the first months of 1942, they stressed the crucial need to reach the Caucasus oilfields so rapidly that the Soviets would not have time to destroy permanently the oil wells and refineries. If the latter were destroyed, the bulk of the Caucasus oil would have to be refined elsewhere until new refineries could be constructed. Only Rumanian refineries, which still had a considerable surplus refinement capacity,'6 could handle large quantities of additional crude, but (for the reasons mentioned above) it would be extremely difficult to ship significant amounts of oil from the Caucasus to Rumania.
The High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) had established an "Oil Detachment Caucasus" a year earlier, in the spring of 1941, when the capture of the oilfields was still a principal objective of the forthcoming attack on the Soviet Union. Its purpose was quickly to repair damaged wells and refineries so that exploitation of the oilfields could be The Luftwaffe, Hitler stated, was to continue providing close and strong support to both army groups. "The early destruction of Stalingrad is especially important," he said.19 As opportunities present themselves, attacks should be made on Astrakhan and mines laid in the Lower Volga. In view of the Caucasus oilfields' critical importance to the prosecution of the war, he stressed, air raids should immediately be launched against railways and pipelines being used by the enemy. However, attacks on refineries, storage tanks and ports used for oil shipments should only be carried out if circumstances on the ground made them absolutely necessary.
Hitler On 8 September 1942-that is, a full month after German troops first entered the Maikop oilfield, choking on thick smoke billowing from burning storage tanks-Dr. Schlicht of the Mineralol Brigade reported to Thomas on progress at Maikop.28 Difficult terrain ("extremely suitable for partisan warfare") prevented the transportation of cumbersome drilling equipment, at least until new transportation routes could be created. In the meantime, Schlicht said, German specialists had to determine which wells would be easiest to unblock. This would not be easy; the Soviets had inflicted massive damage, even to pipelines. "Until now," he emphasized, "only 4,000 cubic meters of oil stocks have been uncovered. It will take at least another six months until regular production can resume." Accordingly, "it is essential we give the Reichsmarschall [Imperial Marshal-Hermann G6ring, Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan and, in effect, Germany's economics czar] a completely accurate picture of Maikop." Goring's understanding of the situation, he added, was grossly over-optimistic: "questions are already being raised about whether the southern army groups can now be supplied with fuel directly from Maikop." Schlicht was right: Gdring's grasp of matters relating to oil production was extremely weak. For instance, two months later, on 21 November, he presided over an oil conference in Berlin. Maikop, which had yet to produce oil for Axis troops (and never would, except a few dribbles), remained at the forefront of his mind. "I'm fed up," he exclaimed. "Months have passed since we captured the first oil wells, yet we still aren't getting any benefit."29 He astounded his audience of technical experts when, referring to the concrete plugs dropped down the bores, he naively demanded to know: "Can't you just drill them out with something like a gigantic corkscrew?" On that occasion, Richthofen and Greim had sent Pflugbeil numerous air units and as much aviation fuel as they could spare, as well as transport aircraft and many trucks to carry it, and even teams of their own ground personnel to help unload the fuel and supplies and construct makeshift airfields and facilities. These transfers had exhausted the aircrews, who received no rest from combat in their own sectors before making the long and arduous flights to the Kharkov region. They also taxed the energy and resources of service, maintenance, and labour battalions, who worked ceaselessly in chaotic conditions to organise and equip airfields (including several new ones, hastily transformed from large stretches of grassy plain) and prepare arriving aircraft for their new missions.
Because several of the airstrips were not near German railheads and established supply routes, and some lacked decent roads, Luftwaffe the Soviets, were incapable of bringing down a high number of aircraft or preventing widespread damage.
So, then, why did Hitler not order the Luftwaffe to attack Grozny and Baku during August, when he had the means to do so and little chance of capturing the oilfields intact or with minor damage? Two reasons exist. First, he failed entirely to grasp the significance of Maikop's destruction by Soviet rearguards, and seems to have naively considered it possible that the other oilfields, even if they also suffered attack, could be exploited within a comparatively short period if captured promptly. Accordingly, even after the advance of List's army group slowed to a crawl in the face of inadequate air support, dwindling fuel and ammunition, and stiffening Soviet resistance, Hitler refused to terminate the Caucasus offensive, or even allow a pause for regrouping and the establishment of winter positions. When List failed to increase the tempo in early September, Hitler dismissed him and announced to his stunned entourage that he would take personal charge of Army Group A.
Tormented by a growing realisation that his Caucasus campaign was almost over, and filled with disappointment, mistrust, and anger at his general staff, he directed his hostility towards Halder, whom he repeatedly accused of lacking National Socialist ardour and finally sacked two weeks later. He replaced him with Kurt Zeitzler, who was not only a fervent Nazi but a dynamic leader whose exceptional organizational abilities, assertive manner, and boundless energy had earned him the nickname "Thunderball" (Kugelblitz).
Neither Zeitzler's "thunder" nor "Field Marshal" Hitler's long-distance command of exhausted Army Group A compensated for the group's acute shortages of supplies, reinforcements, and air support. (The latter was Hitler's own fault; he wanted the Caucasus campaign to succeed, but devoted no airpower to it. He wasted it at Stalingrad instead.) As autumn wind and rain replaced summer sun, the Caucasus campaign steadily petered out, with only very minor changes in the line occurring after the middle of September. By early October, Axis forces were barely moving-and barely surviving, in many cases, due to fierce resistance and shortages of fuel and provisions. Yet, although they almost had Grozny, they were still nowhere near achieving Hitler's major campaign goals.
It was only at this point (as shown below) that HIitler finally embraced reality and, realising that his dream of capturing and exploiting the Caucasus oilfields (at least in the short to medium term) was over, ordered the Luftwaffe to attack the oilfields. He did not, however, order his armies to withdraw behind the Don. They remained in the Caucasus, apparently until a new campaign towards the oilfields could be launched. As it happened, Soviet forces almost encircled them as they did Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Zeitzler persuaded Hitler to pull them back in the nick of time, and they escaped in December 1942 and January 1943 with reasonable losses.
The second reason for Hitler's failure to issue timely orders for air attacks on Grozny and Baku is that in August he became obsessed with capturing Stalingrad and consequently gave it far higher priority than the seizure or destruction of the oilfields. The Luftwaffe's primary function in the southern sector ceased to be support of the armies in the Caucasus (where they would be available for raids against oilfields), and instead became "flying artillery" in support of Sixth Army as it struggled to take Stalingrad.
After Hitler divided his main campaign into two simultaneous offensives in July, Richthofen possessed nowhere near enough aircraft to provide adequate support for both army groups and was soon no longer able, as a result, to create major Schwerpunkte. He spent the next three and a half months hastily swapping units back and forth between Stalingrad and the Caucasus as he attempted to create "local" Schwerpunkte as opportunities arose or crises developed. Those transfers over long distances steadily reduced operational rates. Moreover, air units encountered increasingly numerous Red Air Force units, which proved better trained and equipped than hitherto. To overcome them cost time, effort, and high losses. Luftwaffe units also often had to operate from inadequate airfields, sometimes far from their targets, which were widely scattered over a large area.
Consequently By that stage, Richthofen's bomber strength had risen slightly to 186 airworthy He 11ls and Ju 88s,58 but Hitler's own illogical prioritising, and its consequent impact on the employment of those bombers, offset this small gain. Even after ordering the "massive attacks" on Baku and Astrakhan, Hitler still insisted that the destruction and capture of Stalingrad remained his highest priority. Thus, Richthofen felt unable to commit his bomber forces to attacks on the oilfields. In fact, he could only temporarily reduce the bombardment of Stalingrad and send bomber forces south when bad weather at Stalingrad curtailed operations there.
Hitler's continued emphasis on Stalingrad can be explained. During October intelligence reports revealed strong Soviet build-ups on either side of the city and warned that a major counteroffensive loomed. Hitler remained convinced that the best means of preventing a Soviet breakthrough would be the rapid capture of Stalingrad, which would release the bulk of Sixth Army for defensive duties in and behind the vulnerable sections of the front.59 Hence, even though he wanted-and orderedthe Baku oilfields destroyed to deny Stalin their vast output, he kept the air units that could have attempted it tied up at Stalingrad.
In any event, even though Hitler ordered Baku's destruction by Luftflotte 4, he never ordered Greim's Luftwaffenkommando Ost to participate or transfer units south temporarily for the undertaking. Without this reinforcement, Richthofen's 186 airworthy bombers, scattered throughout Luftflotte 4's vast combat zone, could not possibly have been organised into an attack force and deployed in sufficient mass to significantly wreck Baku's oilfields, refineries, and storage facilities-even if they could reach them; and by October they could not. Most forward airfields in the central Caucasus had been badly damaged by Soviet air forces (which were then far stronger), placing Baku well outside the range of bombers operating from even the closest secure German airfields. Perhaps most importantly, by the last week of October Richthofen had a far more pressing mission: the deployment of every spare aircraft against the Soviet forces revealed by his reconnaissance units to be preparing a massive offensive to snare Sixth Army at Stalingrad As it happened, then, Hitler's illogical prioritising effectively prevented Richthofen from committing his bomber forces to attacks on the oilfields. In fact, even in October he could only temporarily reduce Stalingrad's bombardment and send bomber forces south when weather conditions curtailed operations there. On those occasions, he usually had to deploy them in support of the beleaguered armies still stretched out across the width of the Caucasus, and could seldom spare them for missions against economic targets. When he did, the raids were too little, too late. Although he inflicted pleasing damage on a few refineries and oilfields, particularly at Grozny, he proved woefully incapable of crippling Soviet oil production.
